Can Syria avoid becoming another Libya or Iraq? A week after Assad’s fall, here are 3 possible futures

After the fall of the Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the world was moved by emotional scenes of liberation — families reuniting after years of separation and former prisoners walking free from the brutal conditions of Assad’s prisons.

These moments of joy mirrored similar scenes from the fall of past regimes in the region, such as the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan.

Yet, history also warns us of the challenges that come next: the initial euphoria often gives way to instability, tragedy and regret, with many longing for the perceived order of the old regime.

The question now is whether Syria can chart a different course this time, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued other nations after similar upheavals.

A country long divided

Syria is an ethnically and religiously fragmented country, with four key groups that have conflicting political agendas:

1) The Kurds: this ethnic group of 2.5 million people^[1] controls northeastern Syria on the border with Turkey, with whom they have a hostile relationship.

As a result, there are tensions between the US-backed Kurds and Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the rebel group that led the coalition of opposition forces overthrowing Assad’s regime.

These groups agreed to a ceasefire^[2] last week, but there are already reports it has collapsed^[3].

Complicating matters further, the Kurds are a strategic ally of Israel^[4], which has historically supported their aspirations for an autonomous state across parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran.

2) Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS): the rebel group that now controls much of the country is made up of a spectrum of Islamist factions. These include moderates, hardline jihadists and foreign fighters from Central Asia with radical Islamist backgrounds. The group also claims to represent the Sunni Arab majority in Syria.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) has attempted to rebrand the group as moderate, though he retains ambitions for an Islamic governance model. He recently told CNN^[5]:

People who fear Islamic governance either have seen incorrect implementations of it or do not understand it properly.

This is a major concern for Jordan and Egypt, both of which face political challenges from the Muslim Brotherhood, whose Syrian branch is affiliated with HTS.

3) The Druze community: Syria’s third-largest group primarily resides in the south near the Israeli border. Some Druze leaders have reportedly called^[6] to be annexed by Israel, though others in Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, seized from Syria in 1967, have called^[7] for the Golan Heights to return to Syrian control.

Israel has just approved a plan to expand settlements in the Golan Heights, and Israeli troops have advanced^[8] beyond the demilitarised zone on the border in recent days.

4) Alawite Shiites and Christians: these are the most vulnerable minorities following the collapse of the Assad regime, as no neighbouring nation or local faction has expressed an interest or has the capability to protect them.

Three possible outcomes

Now, analysing these power dynamics within Syria and the broader regional geopolitics suggests three potential scenarios for the country’s future:

1) A federal secular state. This scenario envisions a federal structure for Syria, accommodating its multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition. A federal system would allow all groups to have representation at both the local and federal levels.

The Kurds, who already enjoy de facto autonomy, along with many other minorities, support this approach^[9].

HTS, however, has not officially commented on the Kurdish role in a new state. Speaking diplomatically^[10], al-Sharaa has only said

in the next Syria, the Kurds will be fundamental. We will live together and everyone will get their rights by law.

Acceptance of a federal model in the broader region is also mixed.

Israel supports federalism. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar recently said^[11] a single Syrian state with effective control and sovereignty over all its area is “unrealistic”. He added:

The logical thing is to strive for autonomy for the various minorities in Syria, perhaps with a federal structure.

Other neighbouring countries like Jordan and Turkey, however, oppose the idea. They fear the influence such an arrangement could have on their own minority populations, particularly the Kurds in Turkey.

2) A strong, centralised state. This model would be based on a central government dominated by Sunni Islamist groups, such as HTS. It could result in authoritarian governance, the marginalisation of minorities and an increased role for Islamic law in governance.

Turkey strongly supports this scenario, which it sees as a way to eliminate the threat of the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia that controls portions of northern Syria. Ankara believes it is aligned^[12] with the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey.

A strong, centralised state would also allow Turkey to extend its influence in Syria. It has economic motivations for this, such as its ambitions to establish a gas pipeline from Qatar to Europe^[13] via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria.

Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar hinted at this possibility^[14] recently, stating:

If this happens, the route must be secure. Hopefully, it will be, as that is our wish.

3) Prolonged conflict and de facto separation. This is the worst possible outcome for the Syrian people – continuing violence and Syria remaining divided along ethnic and religious lines.

There are numerous factors suggesting Syria could be heading in this direction, following the path of Libya and Sudan in recent years. Syria has ethnic groups with deeply held, historical grievances, which have been exacerbated by an authoritarian government. It also does not have a strong democratic tradition.

This scenario benefits Israel immensely, as it weakens one of its historical enemies. And Turkey would likely seek to expand its occupation of parts of northern Syria to further challenge the Kurdish fighters there.

What does the region want?

As all of these scenarios illustrate, Syria’s future is inextricably linked to a regional landscape in which various nations exert influence, each pursuing distinct political, economic and security interests.

Eight members of the Arab League met recently^[15] in Jordan to express their support for a “peaceful transition process” in Syria. They also met separately^[16] with the top diplomats from the US and Turkey, calling for an inclusive government that respects minority rights.

However, this conference did not result in a solid plan due to sharp differences among the attendees about the future of Syria, in addition to the absence of other key players like Israel. Under the current circumstances, forming an international framework for the future of Syria is essential.

References

1. ^{^} ethnic group of 2.5 million people (minorityrights.org)
2. ^{^} ceasefire (www.middleeastmonitor.com)
3. ^{^} collapsed (www.al-monitor.com)
4. ^{^} strategic ally of Israel (www.meforum.org)
5. ^{^} told CNN (edition.cnn.com)
6. ^{^} have reportedly called (www.jpost.com)
7. ^{^} called (www.france24.com)
8. ^{^} advanced (www.nytimes.com)
9. ^{^} support this approach (frontline.thehindu.com)
10. ^{^} Speaking diplomatically (www.agenzianova.com)
11. ^{^} recently said (allisrael.com)
12. ^{^} aligned (www.reuters.com)
13. ^{^} gas pipeline from Qatar to Europe (www.turkiyetoday.com)
14. ^{^} hinted at this possibility (www.intellinews.com)
15. ^{^} met recently (www.aljazeera.com)
16. ^{^} met separately (www.euronews.com)