A two-state solution is gaining momentum again for Israel and the Palestinians. Does it have a chance of success?

As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the two-state solution^[1] to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “dead^[2]”. Now, it is showing signs of life again.

French President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly pressing^[3] other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “political necessity^[4]”.

Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has reaffirmed^[5] its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”.

During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a surprising pledge^[6] to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state.

Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.

The UN conference on June 17–20, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to^[7] go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution.

Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle for decades^[8]. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years.

So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success?

What is the two-state solution?

Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s^[9].

In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day.

The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel^[10] and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the the Abraham Accords^[11], without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution.

The Hamas attacks on Israel – and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza – have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate.

On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially set back the legitimacy^[12] of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage.

On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo – the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war – is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights.

And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May^[13] and reports of mass Palestinian starvation^[14] have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers.

Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition.

For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will – both globally and in the Middle East – towards a two-state solution.

Huge obstacles remain

But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks.

First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire.

Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue.

The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role^[15] in governing a future Palestinian state.

Though anti-Hamas sentiment is becoming more vocal^[16] among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been violently cracking down^[17] on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power.

However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah – the party leading the Palestinian National Authority – is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21%^[18]. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership.

There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state^[19]. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page.

This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan for Israel to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza^[20]. The government also just approved its largest expansion^[21] of settlements in the West Bank in decades.

These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than 700,000^[22] in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been increasing at a faster rate^[23] since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022.

Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state defining^[24] it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”.

The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become.

Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just 40% of Palestinians^[25] support it, while only 26% of Israelis^[26] believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel.

However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations.

A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but peace was achieved^[27] through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union.

In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made.

It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

References

1. ^{^} two-state solution (theconversation.com)
2. ^{^} dead (theconversation.com)
3. ^{^} reportedly pressing (www.politico.eu)
4. ^{^} political necessity (www.theguardian.com)
5. ^{^} reaffirmed (www.theguardian.com)
6. ^{^} surprising pledge (www.france24.com)
7. ^{^} wants to (news.un.org)
8. ^{^} for decades (theconversation.com)
9. ^{^} the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s (theconversation.com)
10. ^{^} recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (www.nytimes.com)
11. ^{^} the Abraham Accords (www.mei.edu)
12. ^{^} set back the legitimacy (theconversation.com)
13. ^{^} return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May (www.abc.net.au)
14. ^{^} mass Palestinian starvation (news.un.org)
15. ^{^} Hamas cannot play any role (journal.un.org)
16. ^{^} becoming more vocal (www.abc.net.au)
17. ^{^} violently cracking down (www.amnesty.org.uk)
18. ^{^} is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21% (pcpsr.org)
19. ^{^} not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state (theconversation.com)
20. ^{^} indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza (abcnews.go.com)
21. ^{^} largest expansion (edition.cnn.com)
22. ^{^} 700,000 (www.bbc.com)
23. ^{^} increasing at a faster rate (apnews.com)
24. ^{^} defining (www.timesofisrael.com)
25. ^{^} 40% of Palestinians (pcpsr.org)
26. ^{^} 26% of Israelis (www.newsweek.com)
27. ^{^} peace was achieved (theconversation.com)