Polls suggest this man could become Turkey’s next president. Erdoğan is doing everything to stop him

A Turkish proverb – düştüğün yerden kalk – counsels that one should arise from where one has fallen.

Ekrem İmamoğlu^[1], the jailed mayor of Istanbul and main rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey’s 2028 election, has taken this advice to heart.

Imprisoned in March on charges widely viewed to be concocted, İmamoğlu refuses to be silenced. Earlier this month, he published a by-invitation essay^[2] in The Economist setting out his vision for Turkey as an open democracy that plays a constructive role on the global stage.

İmamoğlu’s proverbial fall was not mere clumsiness. Members of his opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) called his arrest a “civilian coup^[3]”, pointing the finger at the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Erdoğan.

İmamoğlu was also charged with corruption and terror links just days before he was set to be anointed the CHP’s candidate for the 2028 presidential election.

Turks from Istanbul to Anatolia^[4] immediately rose up to vent their fury. Protests continued for weeks despite bans on public gatherings. The government has since widened its net to arrest dozens^[5] of other opposition figures.

Erdoğan duly accused the opposition of fomenting unrest^[6]. But much like uprisings in 2013 that started over a government plan to redevelop an Istanbul park and metastasised into a wider protest movement^[7], these rallies were a spontaneous reaction to Erdoğan’s own policies.

Turkey’s creeping authoritarianism under Erdoğan

Erdoğan was once hailed a reformer^[8] who might provide a governance model marrying Islamic observance and democracy that could be replicated throughout the Muslim world.

But after ruling for two decades, first as prime minister and then president, he has centralised power^[9] and bent state institutions to his will.

So enmeshed is he in conceptions of the Turkish state and its political and economic architecture, it has spawned new terminology: “Erdoğanism^[10]”. Neighbouring states witnessing similar concentrations of power are said to be undergoing “Erdoğanisation^[11]”.

Turkey under Erdoğan provides a potent example of “new authoritarianism^[12]”, a political model where the leader or ruling party maintains a veneer of democracy while skewing the system to their own advantage. “New authoritarians”, such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Viktor Orban in Hungary, allow regular elections and grant some space to opposition parties. However, they have also constricted institutions and processes, hobbled the judiciary, the media and civil society, and rendered themselves unassailable.

Documenting the deterioration under Erdoğan, Freedom House rates^[13] Turkey’s political freedom at 33 out of 100, ranking it between Pakistan and Jordan. It notes shortcomings in electoral processes, political participation, the functioning of government, freedom of expression and rule of law.

Meanwhile, Amnesty International points to^[14]:

• government interference in judicial processes
• unjustified prosecutions and convictions of human rights defenders, journalists and opposition politicians
• restrictions on freedom of assembly
• violence against women.

Despite this, international leaders seem reluctant to admonish Erdoğan for democratic backsliding under his watch. Other than some tepid statements from the European Union, İmamoğlu’s arrest attracted little criticism^[15].

In recent months, US President Donald Trump has described Turkey as a “good place^[16]” and praised Erdoğan’s qualities as a leader. The EU has also resumed discussions with Ankara on security issues^[17].

This reflects the increasingly important role^[18] Turkey plays on the international stage. It has harboured millions of Syrian refugees and has mediated^[19] between Ukraine and Russia to try to end the war there.

As such, Western leaders are reluctant to get Erdoğan offside by raising Turkey’s internal politics.

Read more: Inaction from Brussels over the arrest of an opposition leader in Turkey may be a strategic mistake^[20]

Youth movement pushing for change

Yet, like all authoritarians, Erdoğan is most wary of the electorate.

He has long defined his leadership as the personification of milli irade – the “national will^[21]”. However, after years of economic downturns and shrinking personal freedoms, fewer Turkish voters^[22] are buying it.

Several polls have İmamoğlu well placed to win^[23] the next presidential election in 2028, even though his university degree has been revoked (in dubious circumstances), which makes him ineligible to run. Indeed, İmamoğlu has grown even more popular^[24] since his arrest.

Such was Erdoğan’s concern that he banned images of Imamoğu, only to see his wife, Dilek, raise her voice^[25] to become an opposition figurehead^[26].

In particular, a younger generation^[27] of voters, having known nothing but Erdoğan’s rule, is looking for an alternative and turning towards İmamoğlu.

The Turkish journalist and political commentator Ece Temelkuran suggests^[28] the energy and new ideas of politically disenfranchised youth are capable of overturning old-school authoritarianism.

Indeed, demonstrations since İmamoğlu’s arrest have seen high turnouts of Gen Z protesters. Even Pikachu^[29] made an appearance – a protester dressed in a costume of the video game character fleeing the police in Antalya. And a youth delegate^[30] recently raised the issue of İmamoğlu’s imprisonment at the Council of Europe, only to be arrested on returning to Ankara.

And even as Erdoğan has restricted the political playing field in Turkey, İmamoğlu has proven to be a canny and agile operator.

He presents as affable and engaging, both domestically and internationally, in contrast with Erdoğan’s often belligerent posture. He won the Istanbul mayoral race in 2019 on a platform of “radical love^[31]”. The approach won hearts and minds in an electorate long defined by polarisation and nationalist rhetoric.

When he was detained in March, İmamoğlu reportedly even quipped^[32] to police officers that their work conditions were so poor, they should come and work in his municipality.

Despite Erdoğan’s consolidation of power, democracy may yet have legs in Turkey. Even with İmamoğlu in prison, an energised opposition and younger generation hankering for greater freedoms seem fully intent on arising from where they fall.

References

1. ^{^} Ekrem İmamoğlu (www.bbc.com)
2. ^{^} by-invitation essay (www.economist.com)
3. ^{^} civilian coup (www.reuters.com)
4. ^{^} Anatolia (x.com)
5. ^{^} arrest dozens (www.reuters.com)
6. ^{^} fomenting unrest (www.bbc.com)
7. ^{^} wider protest movement (theconversation.com)
8. ^{^} reformer (content.time.com)
9. ^{^} centralised power (www.mei.edu)
10. ^{^} Erdoğanism (doi.org)
11. ^{^} Erdoğanisation (x.com)
12. ^{^} new authoritarianism (doi.org)
13. ^{^} rates (freedomhouse.org)
14. ^{^} points to (www.amnesty.org)
15. ^{^} attracted little criticism (theconversation.com)
16. ^{^} good place (www.hurriyetdailynews.com)
17. ^{^} security issues (www.rfi.fr)
18. ^{^} important role (www.rusi.org)
19. ^{^} mediated (www.hudson.org)
20. ^{^} Inaction from Brussels over the arrest of an opposition leader in Turkey may be a strategic mistake (theconversation.com)
21. ^{^} national will (www.politico.eu)
22. ^{^} fewer Turkish voters (www.pewresearch.org)
23. ^{^} well placed to win (www.turkishminute.com)
24. ^{^} more popular (www.reuters.com)
25. ^{^} raise her voice (www.economist.com)
26. ^{^} opposition figurehead (www.dw.com)
27. ^{^} younger generation (www.economist.com)
28. ^{^} suggests (www.theguardian.com)
29. ^{^} Pikachu (www.reuters.com)
30. ^{^} youth delegate (www.instagram.com)
31. ^{^} radical love (doi.org)
32. ^{^} quipped (t24.com.tr)