how to be indispensable to the US without relying on it

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to Australia this week comes against a turbulent geopolitical backdrop. The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran – and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz – have put energy issues at the top of the agenda^[1].

The war has also weakened the United States’ strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. The US has had to divert crucial assets from the region to the Middle East, such as the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit^[2], based in Japan. There are also concerns about US missile stockpiles, as well as the overall attention of the Trump administration on the region.

As two of the most important US allies in the region, both countries see US military presence as essential to their defence strategies^[3] and have been vigilant in countering China’s coercive actions^[4].

Now, however, policymakers in both Tokyo and Canberra are wondering if the US will return to the old status quo after Trump’s departure, or if this is a sign of a bigger shift to a new American grand strategy.

Why is the Australia-Japan relationship so important?

Amid growing uncertainty, predictable partnerships have taken on greater value.

The Australia–Japan relationship has steadily deepened in recent decades, particularly in strategic and defence partnerships. This is exemplified by the contract^[5] that Australia signed last month with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to buy 11 next-generation frigates.

Takaichi’s visit is also being framed around the 50th anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation^[6] between the two countries. But the real importance lies in what comes next and how far the alignment between the two countries can extend.

Despite converging interests, Japan and Australia do not see every issue the same way. As their cooperation deepens, these differences are likely to become more visible – and, in some cases, more consequential.

Two ways of reading the relationship

The Australia-Japan relationship can be viewed through two quite different lenses.

The first is through a “middle power” lens^[7]. In response to the fracturing world order, both Japan and Australia are building more self-reliant defence, economic and political systems to push back against the hegemonic tendencies of the US and China.

Through this lens, their relationship is the nucleus of a looser coalition of partners that also includes the ASEAN bloc, India, New Zealand and the Pacific island nations. Together, they can form a strong framework capable of withstanding pressure from either direction.

The second way of viewing the relationship is through a “great power order” lens.

Through this lens, Japan and Australia are working to preserve the postwar international order centred on the United States. Both countries are strengthening their alliances with Washington and sustaining US engagement in the Indo-Pacific. This means reinforcing the existing system, not building an alternative to it.

In this view, the greatest threat to both countries comes from authoritarian states, particularly China.

These two readings of the current geostrategic environment can coexist. But where the governments in Tokyo and Canberra decide to put their emphasis matters enormously. This differs depending on the policy area.

Seeking more independence on trade

In economics and trade policy, the new middle-power coalition building has real traction.

Tokyo and Canberra have both been subject to Trump’s tariffs. And both have already shown they can act independently of Washington, and even alongside Beijing, when it suits them.

Both Japan and Australia have led the negotiations to deepen and expand^[8] the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP^[9]) after the US withdrew in Trump’s first term in office. This free-trade agreement includes 12 countries that comprise 14% of global GDP^[10].

And both have ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is touted as the world’s largest free-trade agreement^[11] in terms of members’ GDPs. This group includes China, but not the United States.

Heavy reliance on US for defence

In defence matters, however, the picture is very different. Japan has no appetite for a middle-power approach. The US alliance is foundational – not optional – because of China, North Korea and Russia on its doorstep.

This is Takaichi’s policy. She is following closely in the footsteps of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and viewing the United States not as a partner to hedge against, but as an anchor to keep engaged.

Takaichi has also taken a hard line against China. She caused a diplomatic storm last year by suggesting, for instance, that Japan would feel compelled to defend Taiwan^[12] if it was invaded by China.

However, the threat posed by China looks different when viewed from Australia. China is not on Australia’s doorstep. So, at least initially, Australia would not be on the front lines of a regional war.

Some have also pointed out that Taiwan’s importance is not well understood^[13] by the general public, with many Australians believing tensions in the Taiwan Strait are simply “not Australia’s problem.”

This gap in threat perception has led some analysts^[14] to ask whether a more hawkish Japan could pull Australia into a conflict it would not otherwise choose to enter.

Yet Australia is also deeply entwined with the US militarily^[15] – through intelligence sharing, AUKUS and the rotational deployment of American forces to Australia. In practice, Australia’s strategic choices in a conflict over Taiwan would be heavily shaped by that existing entanglement, regardless of what Canberra says publicly.

Accepting that reality^[16] is, paradoxically, what gives the Australia–Japan relationship its real value. Both countries are deeply tied to the United States for their national security, and neither is in a position to opt out.

The question is not whether to rely on that alliance, but how to make themselves indispensable to it – so that American engagement in the Indo-Pacific remains worthwhile for Washington, not just assumed.

That is a difficult balance to strike. Takaichi’s visit is an opportunity to think through, carefully and honestly, how both countries view this dilemma – and what they are prepared to do about it.

References

1. ^{^} agenda (eastasiaforum.org)
2. ^{^} 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (news.usni.org)
3. ^{^} defence strategies (www.defence.gov.au)
4. ^{^} coercive actions (www.internationalaffairs.org.au)
5. ^{^} contract (thediplomat.com)
6. ^{^} 50th anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (www.dfat.gov.au)
7. ^{^} “middle power” lens (www.pm.gc.ca)
8. ^{^} deepen and expand (theconversation.com)
9. ^{^} CPTPP (oia.pmc.gov.au)
10. ^{^} comprise 14% of global GDP (www.weforum.org)
11. ^{^} world’s largest free-trade agreement (www.dfat.gov.au)
12. ^{^} defend Taiwan (www.bbc.com)
13. ^{^} not well understood (theconversation.com)
14. ^{^} some analysts (www.afr.com)
15. ^{^} deeply entwined with the US militarily (theconversation.com)
16. ^{^} reality (www.lowyinstitute.org)