the world according to Putin and Trump

What does an ideal world look like for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump? In a word: ugly.

Trump’s embrace^[1] of Russia’s dictator, his bullying^[2] of a weakened Ukraine, his musings about new US territorial conquests^[3], and his dismantling of US democratic institutions would, in any other age, have resulted in his immediate removal from office.

And yet he has succeeded in beating his political opponents into submission, while his cultish following applauds^[4] every fresh outrage he visits on America’s friends, and every undeserved boon he grants its enemies.

American interests?

When discussing foreign policy, we typically use the term “national interests^[5]” to frame our understanding of what countries want, and the enablers and constraints that affect their chances of achieving it. Essentially, we to try to identify some parameters about what countries can, can’t, and might do.

It assumes that factors such as economic heft, military capability, natural resources, alliance networks and geopolitical position all create a kind of baseline^[6] unique to each nation. It also assumes a fair amount of continuity in foreign policy, as new governments invariably face the same kinds of challenges and opportunities as past ones.

And crucially, it assumes leaders will recognise it: that in democracies, for instance, elected public servants will continue acting in the broader public good.

Not so for Trump. His behaviour is far more reminiscent of Putin’s. Like the Russian autocrat he idolises, Trump’s main domestic and foreign agendas^[7] revolve around his personal fortune, cementing his political power, and creating a narrative that existential forces – as well as internal enemies – are to blame for America’s problems.

By presenting himself as the nation’s only possible saviour^[8], Trump is directly plagiarising^[9] the Putin playbook.

Like Russia’s tsar in all but name, Trump is creating an image of the state in which regime security^[10] and national security are innately linked. In that way, America First and Trump First are not just compatible, but actually synonymous.

Trajectories of power

Where the two differ, though, is that Putin’s recipe for dominating Russian politics has tended to increase his country’s raw national power, rather than diminishing it.

Certainly, Putin’s renationalisation of Russia’s energy sector^[11] helped turn Russia into a petro-giant. That Putin has remained at the top of Russian politics for so long has been at least partly because he has distributed Russian wealth beyond a clique of oligarchs.

The result was a larger middle class^[12], apathetic to politics and tolerant of dictatorship, as long as living standards were improving^[13].

At the same time, Putin’s erosion of freedoms created powerful disincentives to express any opposition to his regime. After all, when criticising Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine can lead to beatings^[14], ostracism from society, being sent to the front, or a prison sentence of up to 15 years^[15], where’s the value in speaking out?

There are plenty of signs that Trump would like to emulate Putin’s progress. From installing loyalists in the military^[16] and the ostensibly independent Department of Justice^[17] and FBI, coupled with threats against freedom of the press^[18], his subversion of US democracy looks eerily familiar.

But Trump’s recipe for success looks almost certain to weaken the US, not strengthen it.

He has surrounded himself with completely unqualified supplicants in key roles, chosen on the basis of loyalty rather than competence^[19].

Purges at the CIA^[20] are weakening America’s vaunted intelligence-gathering capabilities. Orders to stop cyber operations^[21] against Russia are an extraordinary own-goal.

Trump’s punishment of partners via tariffs – along with continued suggestions about annexing Canada^[22], and his belittling of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau by calling him “governor^[23]” – are costing America friendships built on decades of trust.

These schisms are becoming evident across the Atlantic too. In France, for instance, even the far-right nationalist Marine Le Pen^[24] has criticised Trump’s standover tactics in suspending military aid to Ukraine. A recent French poll^[25] found that fully 73% of respondents believed Trump’s US was no longer an ally.

A new age of empires

The recent – and historically breathtaking – statement by Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, that Russian and US worldviews now largely align^[26] speaks volumes about the kind of world both regimes now agree on.

It is, put simply, a new Age of Empires. This has long been a central theme of Russian geopolitical propaganda: that all major decisions affecting the world^[27] should be taken in only three of its capitals: Moscow, Beijing and Washington.

In this brutal order, the strong do as they will, and the weak do as they must. It envisages a world cleaved into spheres of influence, with Russia permitted to run rampant over Eastern Europe, the US dominating the Americas and the East Pacific, and China as a hybrid maritime and continental power exerting hegemony in Asia.

So how worried should we be? When we think of past global dangers, events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis come to mind. This is, of course, not the same: there isn’t the potential imminence of nuclear war.

But there should nonetheless be not just deep concern but also immediate action to inoculate ourselves^[28], as best we can, from the slow-burn effect of a world made safe for autocracy rather than democracy.

There is also a legitimate counterargument that Trump’s bark is worse than his bite; that he will be a lame duck^[29] after the mid-term elections in 2026; and that all US allies need do is to keep a low profile until then.

That may have been an appropriately soothing sentiment during Trump’s first term, but in his second one it rings increasingly hollow.

For one thing, the goalposts have shifted. Trump has shown he will act with near-total impunity. He will doubtless try to manipulate elections^[30], and he has shown before that he is perfectly prepared to reject their outcomes^[31]. For another, this time he will have not just a pliant legislature and cabinet, but also a loyal bureaucracy, and key supporters in law enforcement and military posts.

Given that, it is one thing to hope for the best. But it makes sense also to plan for the worst. If the past few weeks have taught us anything, it is to be prepared for virtually daily episodes of disappointment. Or, to put it bluntly: things will get worse before they get better.

References

1. ^{^} embrace (www.msn.com)
2. ^{^} bullying (www.politico.com)
3. ^{^} new US territorial conquests (www.lowyinstitute.org)
4. ^{^} applauds (www.washingtonpost.com)
5. ^{^} national interests (www.jstor.org)
6. ^{^} baseline (www.tandfonline.com)
7. ^{^} domestic and foreign agendas (www.politico.eu)
8. ^{^} saviour (www.abc.net.au)
9. ^{^} plagiarising (www.bbc.com)
10. ^{^} regime security (www.researchgate.net)
11. ^{^} energy sector (www.atlanticcouncil.org)
12. ^{^} larger middle class (www.russiamatters.org)
13. ^{^} living standards were improving (www.reuters.com)
14. ^{^} beatings (www.opendemocracy.net)
15. ^{^} 15 years (www.reuters.com)
16. ^{^} military (www.theguardian.com)
17. ^{^} Department of Justice (www.npr.org)
18. ^{^} freedom of the press (www.theguardian.com)
19. ^{^} competence (www.vanityfair.com)
20. ^{^} CIA (www.justsecurity.org)
21. ^{^} stop cyber operations (apnews.com)
22. ^{^} annexing Canada (www.bbc.com)
23. ^{^} governor (thehill.com)
24. ^{^} Marine Le Pen (x.com)
25. ^{^} French poll (elabe.fr)
26. ^{^} largely align (www.washingtonpost.com)
27. ^{^} major decisions affecting the world (en.kremlin.ru)
28. ^{^} inoculate ourselves (www.lowyinstitute.org)
29. ^{^} lame duck (news.bgov.com)
30. ^{^} manipulate elections (www.bbc.com)
31. ^{^} reject their outcomes (www.abc.net.au)