With its new leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, does Iran want – or need – a nuclear weapon?
- Written by: Weekend Times
As the US war against Iran drags on with no end in sight, an important question has faded into the background. Does Iran want a nuclear weapon, and if so, can it
still build one?
With the Strait of Hormuz now the main sticking point between the two sides, it seems puzzling the nuclear question hasn’t received more attention. The potential of a nuclear Iran was one of the primary stated reasons for the US and Israeli strikes on the country in both 2025 and 2026.
Iran has made very clear its ability to control the flow of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. This has given it a new tool to exert leverage on the international community, even after the war ends.
But its ambitions around a nuclear weapons program are even more opaque than they were before the war.
Can Iran still build a nuclear weapon?
Iran is currently believed to have about 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60%, which is theoretically enough to build 10 nuclear warheads.
Nuclear power plants only require enrichment between 3-5% and nuclear research projects generally require a maximum of 20%.
Iran’s enrichment activity is therefore concerning, as there is no reason other than weaponisation for this level of enrichment. This certainly suggests the Iranian regime is keeping its options open.
Because successful nuclear weapons programs also require materials and equipment, the US and Israeli bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites may have set back its ability to actually build a bomb. But the expertise is perhaps more important. As one nuclear expert put it, the “knowledge and capabilities cannot be bombed away”.
US intelligence believes the new Iranian supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is also far more interested than his father in pursuing a nuclear weapon.
This means short of a US-Israeli ground invasion, regime change operation or sustained occupation, Iran will likely still have the option to pursue a nuclear weapon if it so chooses.
Read more: Could we live with a nuclear-armed Iran? Reluctantly, yes
Would it want to?
But is Iran likely to go down that path? Why would it want to do this?
According to nuclear deterrence theory, governments choose to pursue nuclear weapons primarily to deter nuclear or conventional attacks from their adversaries. In this sense, nuclear weapons are never meant to be used, but their mere possession creates an untenable risk for a potential attacker.
For example, the United States is extremely unlikely to attack North Korea because it now has nuclear-capable weapons to strike Japan, South Korea or the US territory of Guam.
A nuclear weapon would therefore theoretically give Iran enormous latitude in the region, as its neighbours would be very reluctant to attack a nuclear weapon state. It would also allow Iran to respond to a hypothetical Israeli nuclear strike.
However, experts and commentators seem to be divided on whether the war has made nuclear weapons a necessity for Iran.
Yes, the US and Israel would likely not have attacked Iran if it already possessed nuclear warheads. However, Iran has also withstood months of attacks without them, arguably gaining the upper hand against much more powerful states.
It has proven its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz, which provides a fairly effective economic deterrent against future attacks without the unwanted attention of an active nuclear weapons program.
It is entirely possible Iran has kept its stockpile of enriched uranium for so long to use purely as a diplomatic bargaining chip to gain security assurances and reintegration into the global economy.
Before this year’s war broke out, the regime had signalled its openness to diluting its stockpile in exchange for the US lifting sanctions. Iran also agreed to “downblend” its enriched uranium as part of the memorandum of understanding reached with the US to end the war in June.
Given all this, the chance of a nuclear Iran in the future is not zero. But even the Trump administration’s own intelligence community publicly acknowledged last year that Iran has not actively pursued a nuclear weapon for decades.
Does diplomacy stand a chance?
So how does the nuclear issue get resolved?
Arguably, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark Iran nuclear deal of 2015, had already answered this question.
This deal took years to negotiate between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom), plus Germany. And just before the first Trump administration withdrew from the deal in 2018, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran was complying with its obligations.
Iran only started enriching uranium above 20% again after the US left the deal and reimposed sanctions.
A diplomatic solution like the JCPOA is theoretically still possible. However, it would require two things.
The Trump administration would need to make significant concessions to Iran beyond those that were in the JCPOA. The US appeared willing to make some sizeable concessions to the Iranian regime in the memorandum of understanding in June, but control over the Strait of Hormuz will likely remain contentious.
A new deal will also require basic trust between the two sides, which has all but evaporated.
The JCPOA took years of painstaking negotiation and trust-building to implement, and the hardliners in Iran are even more reluctant to make a deal now with an administration they do not trust. They may also be more receptive to a nuclear weapon than ever before.
Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
