The Palestinian Authority is facing a legitimacy crisis. Can it be reformed to govern a Palestinian state?

When Australia, France, Britain, Canada and a handful of other Western countries recognised a Palestinian state at the United Nations last week, one of their key stipulations was the wholesale reform of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

After decades of accusations of corruption and misrule, however, this will not be easy.

What is the Palestinian Authority?

The PA was established under the Oslo Accords^[1], negotiated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and signed with much fanfare in 1993.

Western governments touted the accords as the path to peace in the Middle East through a two-state solution. This would see a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem alongside the existing Israeli state.

Under the accords, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would be gradually given increased political autonomy under a newly established Palestinian Authority. The PA was tasked with administering these territories, with the power to raise taxes and hold elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and presidency.

Crucially, Israel refused to allow the PA to exercise administrative responsibility over Palestinians in East Jerusalem. This was meant to occur after a five-year period when the so-called “final status” issues of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, refugees and security arrangements were to be negotiated.

Since its inception in 1994, the PA has been controlled exclusively by Fatah, the largest Palestinian political faction. Fatah’s chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, has led the PA as president since 2005, even though he was only elected to a four-year term. Fatah has only had control over the West Bank since 2007, after Hamas won elections and took power in Gaza.

Over the past 30 years, Fatah has integrated itself so extensively into the fabric of Palestinian life that some Middle East experts argue^[2] it could not survive as a political entity without the power it wields through the PA.

However, Fatah and Abbas are deeply unpopular^[3] among Palestinians, who accuse them^[4] of systemic corruption, nepotism, clientelism and bureaucratic malfeasance.

Fatah’s diplomatic efforts have been similarly unpopular due to its inability to effectively counter Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem (known collectively as the Occupied Territories), which stymies any chance of Palestinian statehood.

This has created a legitimacy crisis for Fatah and Abbas. According to renowned Palestinian academic Khaled Hroub’s book^[5] about the founding of Hamas, many Palestinians will only consider a leader legitimate if they are willing to resist Israeli occupation and advance the cause of Palestinian statehood.

In a recent poll of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza, for example, just 6% of respondents said^[6] they would vote for Abbas in a Palestinian election, compared to 41% who would support Marwan Barghouti^[7], currently serving five life sentences in an Israeli jail. Fifteen percent said they would vote for any Hamas candidate.

Such is Abbas’s unpopularity that 85% of Palestinians surveyed want him to resign. The situation is no better for Fatah, which garnered just 18% support in the poll, compared to 29% for Hamas.

Differing expectations

There are two main reasons for this crisis. Both highlight the myriad intractable problems that Western governments face in pushing for a Palestinian state.

First, Palestinian expectations of the role of the PA are incompatible with the expectations of Israel and the international community.

For Palestinians, the PA is an umbrella institution meant to build the institutional capacity necessary for statehood, provide basic services to Palestinians, and continue resisting Israeli occupation.

For Israelis, the PA is expected to administer Palestinians under its occupation and provide the security to thwart any resistance.

To that end, Fatah received significant international funding when the PA was established to create security agencies to maintain law and order in the Occupied Territories. Later agreements between the PA and Israel centred on ensuring extensive “security cooperation” between the two sides.

Israel also demanded^[8] Fatah crush any resistance to its occupation before it would agree to negotiate further on Palestinian statehood. According to researcher Alaa Tartir^[9], when Fatah first tried to reform its security services in 2007, Palestinians viewed this as being less about improving law and order and more about criminalising resistance.

For the international community, the PA is the notional Palestinian “government” and Fatah its preferred negotiating partner in the Middle East peace process purportedly aimed at advancing the two-state solution.

These conflicting expectations have adversely impacted the legitimacy of the PA and Fatah among Palestinians. They are largely seen as ineffective in their primary task of resisting Israeli occupation.

To maintain power in this environment, the PA has become increasingly authoritarian^[10], cracking down on protests^[11]. Abbas’ decision in 2021 to postpone elections^[12] only further damaged his legitimacy.

Financial pressure

The PA has also been financially reliant on Israel’s continued occupation since its inception.

The Oslo Accords made Israel responsible for collecting taxes from Palestinians and then transferring the revenue to the PA monthly. Israel, however, has long been accused^[13] of arbitrarily diverting and withholding this tax revenue.

The PA is also the conduit for international aid to Palestinians. Neither the PA nor Fatah can survive without this aid. This has given the United States – the largest aid donor – significant sway over Palestinian politics, increasing the vulnerability of the PA and Fatah to financial coercion.

For example, in 2018–19, the first Trump administration cut off funding^[14] to Fatah’s security agencies and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides health and education services and infrastructure improvements in the Occupied Territories.

Critics say Trump did this to pressure^[15] Fatah to restart negotiations with Israel as part of its Middle East peace plan, despite it being deeply unpopular among Palestinians.

Fatah’s legitimacy and financial problems worsened after Hamas came to power in Gaza. The surprise election result seriously weakened Fatah’s credibility and made it more reliant on Israel and international donors to remain in power.

Can the PA reform itself?

The problem for Fatah is that reforming the PA as per the West’s stipulations means adopting good governance, financial accountability, and free, fair and open elections. This would require Fatah to give up its institutional power. And this, in turn, threatens its viability and identity.

Then there is the issue of Fatah’s leadership. Abbas is nearly 90 years old. With no obvious successor, the PA would likely face significant internal turmoil until a new leader is selected or anointed by Western leaders.

Without a reformed PA free from Fatah’s unilateral control and outside vested interests, any meaningful advancement towards statehood is extremely unlikely.

But after decades of diplomatic intransigence and complicity by Western governments, it’s highly debatable whether genuine reform is even possible.

References

1. ^{^} Oslo Accords (www.bbc.com)
2. ^{^} argue (www.amazon.com)
3. ^{^} deeply unpopular (www.routledge.com)
4. ^{^} accuse them (www.aljazeera.com)
5. ^{^} book (www.amazon.com.au)
6. ^{^} said (www.pcpsr.org)
7. ^{^} Marwan Barghouti (www.abc.net.au)
8. ^{^} demanded (www.amazon.com.au)
9. ^{^} researcher Alaa Tartir (link.springer.com)
10. ^{^} increasingly authoritarian (ecfr.eu)
11. ^{^} cracking down on protests (www.nytimes.com)
12. ^{^} postpone elections (www.bbc.com)
13. ^{^} has long been accused (www.ohchr.org)
14. ^{^} cut off funding (www.bbc.com)
15. ^{^} pressure (www.theguardian.com)