Israel and Iran are playing a dangerous game of chicken that will be impossible to contain forever

Israel’s strike on military targets in Iran over the weekend is becoming a more routine occurrence in the decades-long rivalry between the two states.

Israel has conducted low-level or “unofficial” operations in Iran in the past, but since the October 7 2023 Hamas attacks on southern Israel and subsequent Israeli war in Gaza, tensions between Iran and Israel have spilled over into direct military confrontation for the first time.

While the consequences of this particular strike are not yet clear, it does show that the violence in the Middle East is not winding down any time soon. This is also a clear example of how easily one conflict – in this case, Gaza – can expand into new conflicts with unintended consequences.

But there are other dimensions at play beyond Gaza and the Palestinians. Relations between Israel and post-revolutionary Iran have never been good. The Iranian government has called for the destruction of Israel^[1], and Israel has used its foreign intelligence service, Mossad, to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program with assassinations^[2] and cyber warfare^[3].

In its most recent direct attack on Iran, Israel struck military targets from the air in the provinces of Tehran, Khuzestan and Ilam, causing minor damage to military installations and killing four soldiers^[4]. Israel had consulted the US State Department about its plans, but the US was not directly involved in the strikes.

Though Tehran has played down the extent of the damage, the Iranian regime has not ruled out a response, which should keep the region on edge for weeks to come. In fact, some hardliners in the Iranian parliament say the strike crossed a red line and a response is necessary^[5].

Who’s to blame here?

Answering the question of “who started it?” in this conflict is not that simple.

If you were to ask the Iranians, they would say the first escalation came in early April when Israel struck an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, Syria^[6], killing two senior Iranian generals, among others.

If you were to ask the Israelis, they would say that attacks by Hezbollah in northern Israel over the past year are effectively Iran throwing the first stone, as Hezbollah is a militant proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)^[7].

Iran has responded to Israeli strikes on its territory twice with barrages of rockets and explosive drones – once in retaliation for the consulate strike^[8] and again in early October^[9] after Ismail Haniyeh, one of the leaders of Hamas, was killed by a strike in Tehran^[10]. Israel’s latest airstrike was in direct response to Iran’s early October retaliation.

US President Joe Biden said^[11] after the latest Israeli attack, “I hope this is the end” – an effort to urge both parties to halt their escalations. But unfortunately it is not his call to make.

Maintaining a delicate balance

There is a reason why direct military strikes between nations are rare, even between sworn enemies. When attacking another state, it is difficult to know exactly how they will respond, though a retaliatory strike is almost often expected.

This is because defence forces are not just used for fighting and winning wars – they are also vital to deterring them^[12]. When a fighting force is attacked, it’s important for it to strike back to maintain the perception it can deter future attacks and make a display of its capabilities. This is what is happening right now between Israel and Iran – neither side wants to appear weak.

If this is the case, where does the escalation end? De-escalation is essentially a game of chicken – one side has to be content with not responding to an attack to take the temperature down.

But there are equal pressures on states to choose to respond to an attack or de-escalate.

On the one hand, showing that your military is incapable of responding to an external threat is unacceptable, and theoretically invites further attacks. An unused deterrent is not a deterrent.

On the other, there’s the risk a retaliation could spiral into all-out conflict with your adversary. In the case of Israel and Iran this would almost certainly mean the involvement of US forces – a dire prospect.

Thankfully, this outcome is unlikely. There are signs both Iran and Israel are using their strikes to “save face” and maintain their deterrence capability rather than escalate tensions further, given the fact both made strikes on nonessential targets.

Both sides have reasons to avoid a larger conflict. Israel has just opened a second front^[13] against its adversaries by targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and would face the largest conventional fighting force in the region^[14] if an all-out war broke out with Iran.

And Iran’s leaders have been under pressure^[15] domestically in recent years due to widespread public discontent. Iran would much rather continue to attack Israel through its proxies and maintain plausible deniability, as a direct war could threaten the regime’s survival.

But this latest strike is also a reminder that the longer conflicts go on, the less likely they are to remain contained. For over a year, the war in Gaza has raised tensions in the region to a fever pitch. A ceasefire would go a long way to reducing these tensions and stop the spread of political violence across the region – before it’s too late.

References

1. ^{^} called for the destruction of Israel (www.reuters.com)
2. ^{^} assassinations (www.nytimes.com)
3. ^{^} cyber warfare (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
4. ^{^} killing four soldiers (www.abc.net.au)
5. ^{^} response is necessary (www.theguardian.com)
6. ^{^} Israel struck an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, Syria (apnews.com)
7. ^{^} militant proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (www.isdp.eu)
8. ^{^} once in retaliation for the consulate strike (www.reuters.com)
9. ^{^} again in early October (www.bbc.com)
10. ^{^} killed by a strike in Tehran (www.aljazeera.com)
11. ^{^} said (www.theguardian.com)
12. ^{^} they are also vital to deterring them (www.rand.org)
13. ^{^} second front (www.reuters.com)
14. ^{^} largest conventional fighting force in the region (newlinesinstitute.org)
15. ^{^} under pressure (theconversation.com)